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 Abstract 
Informal market institutions and small-scale traders are responsible for feeding Nigerian 
cities. This study analyses a range of economic relationships and institutions that have 
evolved in the context of inadequate formal institutions such as banks and legal contracts. 
Through examining both personal relationships and institutional based trust, the paper 
explores the role of moral norms. Trust is shown to be related to sanctions, information on 
other parties and a range of norms that are drawn on both calculatively and habitually. The 
perceived moralities of different forms of institution (such as credit systems, trader 
associations and commission agents) are also examined.  
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Introduction 
The Nigeria domestic food system presents a fascinating case where debates concerning the 
moral economy are played out with huge implications for the well-being of millions of 
people in poverty. Considering the difficult business conditions with no recourse to legal 
systems, corrupt and ineffective police force, minimal banking infrastructure, poor 
communications and a highly degraded transport infrastructure, the movement of food from 
over 70 million food producers to over 60 million urban consumers is a feat of ingenuity. 
Trust and the social institutions in which trust is embedded, underpinned by a range of moral 
norms, shape the economic behaviour in markets and allow the food supply system to 
operate.   
 The process of building cooperation is particularly interesting in these cases as it occurs in a 
context with minimal legal recourse or regulation by the public sector.  Therefore this case 
offers an opportunity to explore questions concerning issues of building trust and 
institutional forms in traders’ access to information, finance, security, dispute settlement 
mechanisms and space, as well as the evolving institutional forms and norms of relating to 
the state and corrupt officials. The traders involved are found to have a number of different 
types of bilateral relations (joint ventures and informal reciprocal arrangements), combined 
with multilateral forms of cooperation in powerful trader associations.  Gender and ethnic 
identity shape access to most forms of cooperation.   
 
The concept and approach of moral economy is used, firstly, to examine both how norms 
underpin trust-based relationships and informal institutions, and, secondly, to examine the 
perceived morality of different forms of institution. With regard to the former, the moral 
economy approach is explored as a way of illuminating how norms and values shape 
economic activities and how they, in turn, are shaped by economic pressures (Sayer, 2004).  
The complex forms of capitalism found in the Nigerian case show how a range of norms and 
moralities co-exist and these both promote and constrain these different forms (Booth, 1994; 
Sayer, 2004).  
 
With regard to the second element of moral economy, each of the forms of social institution 
raises questions over the moral justification of their existence, as they benefit the well-being 
of some while limiting the opportunities of others. This raises questions about how different 
groups have different perceptions of what are considered to be morally justified outcomes in 
terms of improvements to well-being. In particular there are varying discourses concerning 
the roles of traders that are reflected in different policy initiatives amongst local government, 
national/federal government, NGOs and donors.  This inevitably raises further questions 
about who holds power and how it is (or is not) exercised, both within the trader body and 
beyond.  Our discussion below observes the power in mutual action as well as issues of 
power asymmetries and how these are related to trust.  
 
This paper draws on a range of literatures, particularly those of economics, geography, 
anthropology, sociology and development studies, and a detailed case study of food systems 
in Nigeria.  While the case of Nigeria presents relatively unique contexts for exploring the 
issues of the moral economy and norms, the study can contribute to wider theoretical 
discussions on economic behaviour. Furthermore, an Africanist perspective on moral 
economies demonstrates the importance of cultural context while at the same time 
identifying those factors and conceptual frameworks that transcend culture. 
 
Conceptualising the changing relations of trust, power and norms 
 
Power, trust and social relations in food marketing institutions 
Much has been written about the role of trust in trading networks across the world. This is 
particularly important in the West African context where there is poor communication and 
the state plays a limited role (Trager 1981,  Holtzman et al, 1988, Lyon 2000). With regard 
to finance, personalised trust-based informal sources are vital, as banks are unwilling to lend 
to small scale traders (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998).  Informal sources of financing are vital 
to keep trade moving although they can be used exploitatively if individuals become tied 
into debt relations over many years (Watts, 1987; Clough, 1981,1985; Bhaduri, 1986).  In 
such cases relationships of trust may be more based more on domination, although no cases 
of people being tied into debt was found in this case study.  Power might appear to lie 
wholly with the large-scale commission agents and dealers who offer credit to petty traders 
and small producers.  However,  the mediated nature of power is such that the effects of 
power are open to modification, displacement or even disruption, depending on the 
relationships that come into play in any given context.  As our field evidence will 
demonstrate, the transactions conducted by so-called ‘powerful’ commission agents and 
dealers involve considerable risk to these credit suppliers, given the uncertainties inherent in 
local conditions (climatic, political etc.).  Moreover, excessive extortion and barriers to 
market access would lead to failure in the markets upon which everyone ultimately depends.  
Massive exploitation would not be conducive to the mostly economically effective informal 
social networks we have observed in our study area. This is not to deny the existence of a 
section of extremely poor people who are excluded from most aspects of associational life, 
including access to credit, and the other benefits it offers.  
 
Food market traders often form associations which have a number of roles. These include 
providing welfare support for traders, building market infrastructure, sharing market 
information and lending to each other (Smith and Luttrel, 1994). They may also be the 
arenas for setting prices and ensuring the rules of the market are followed (Clark, 1994). 
They play specific roles in dispute resolution (Whetham, 1972; Lyon, 2003) and are 
responsible for hiring private security guards, often part of youth vigilante groups (Gore and 
Pratton, 2002).   The power of collective action by such associations is one of the more 
remarkable features of West African trade, and as we show in our case study, this has mostly 
worked to promote order and sound trading relationships within the market space, rather 
than to fix prices.  Again, however, this is not to deny the potentially exclusionary power of 
associations to disbenefit poor producers, petty traders and consumers (Cleaver, 2005).  
 With this evidence of a wide range of social institutions across West Africa markets, this 
paper’s first research question is: 
 What are the market institutions, relationships and contracts that require elements of 
trust and dependence on moral norms? 
 
Personal relationships, institutional bases of trust and the moral order 
In each of these forms of market institutions trust is of central importance. Trust can be 
defined as an expectation of others’ behaviour (Gambetta, 1988: 217; Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 1996; 5; Zucker, 1986: 54) with confidence based on personal relationships or 
knowledge that there are institutions that can ensure or enforce expected behaviour. Trust 
also requires an element of vulnerability and expectation that the other party will act 
responsibly. Well-placed trust is based on active enquiry, often extended through 
questioning and listening over time, rather than blind acceptance (O’Neill, 2002: 76).  
Personal trust is particularly important where “transactions are so complex that law cannot 
possibly cover all contingent circumstances” (Moore, 1994: 819) and where there are no 
formal systems of contracts available. In such cases more informal personalised 
relationships become increasingly important in order to reduce uncertainty. These 
personalised forms can be considered as either bilateral (between two parties) or multilateral 
where there is trust in others as they are part of the same community or other form of group. 
Since women dominate at the lower end of the trade hierarchy in West Africa, because of 
their limited resources, their dependence on personalised trust is often particularly heavy 
(e.g. Clark, 1994:228-234; Chalfin, 2004:225-252). 
 
With personalised trust, cooperation is ensured through a balance of wanting to act 
reciprocally and being coerced into action due to the sanctions and control exerted by the 
other party. The outcomes for each individual will clearly depend in part on the specific 
balance of power achieved between the parties.  This supports Mollering’s (2005) view of 
the duality of trust and control with both assuming the existence of the other.   This paper 
will explore the relationships between unequals and the extent to which trust is a product 
and mask for domination. Interpretation of the moral order is likely to be weighted towards 
the more powerful individual or to the individual whose patrons have the greater power. 
This paper will explore the relationships between non equals and the extent to which trust is 
a product of domination. 
 
Trust can also be based on institutional forms of trust whereby actors can build confidence 
without having a personalised relationship. The institutional forms allow one party to take 
action against another if an agreement is not honoured. Institutionally based trust is built up 
through ensuring that those relying on these institutions perceive them to be trustworthy and 
able to sanction norm breakers. Institutionally- based trust is most frequently underpinned 
by state developed and enforced legislation. In the food marketing context FAO (2001) and 
Cullinan (1997) divide these into the enabling functions (laws of contract, property rights, 
exchange and security/collateral), economic regulatory functions (laws of unfair 
competition/cartels, weights and measures, quality, and tax) and constraining functions to 
avoid socially undesirable consequences (consumer protection, urban planning, 
environmental protection).  
 
For institutionally- based trust, trust in the institution allows people to trust others, and can 
only operate when those using the institutions perceive them to be trustworthy. This may 
operate best when these institutions are invisible or perceived to be inevitable (Searle, 2004)  
However, in a Nigerian context, government related regulatory forms have been associated 
with widespread corruption and, in the food sector, a lack of capacity for enforcement 
(Mustapha and Meagher, 2000:36).   This has led to loss of trust in these forms of 
institutions. They have been abandoned where possible in favour of parallel non-state forms 
of regulation that encourage institutional based trust such as trader associations and transport 
unions.  
 
This leads to the second research question: 
 How are personal social relations and institutional forms used to ensure trust? 
 
Roles of moral norms in shaping relationships and institutions 
Discussions on the nature and formation of norms underlying trust are restricted as they are 
intangible and difficult to observe. Norms define what actions are deemed to be right or 
wrong, and include customs of cooperation, reciprocity and interaction with strangers. 
Furthermore, norms cannot be produced at will and their creation or shaping depends on the 
cultural background to the relationship, including market exchange contexts (Harriss-White 
1996:318). 
 
For personal trust the act of reciprocity is a norm of behaviour that involves an element of 
altruism or benevolence, and involves an ethical decision that is not only based on self 
interest (Sayer, 2004). Indeed, trutworthiness may be regarded a a duty and part of being a 
good and honorable person. Trust is also based on sanctions for those breaking norms, with 
enforcement only possible with social consensus, shaming and threats to others’ esteem 
(Brennan and Pettit, 2004) as there are norms that shape what forms of sanctions are allowed 
in particular circumstances among particular groups (from peer pressure, shaming, damaging 
personal reputations and exclusion from economic or community activities through to 
physical threats and actual bodily harm) (Porter and Lyon, 2006).  
 
In addition to the moral norms that shape societal behaviour, there are norms that shape how 
individuals in a particular context regard the morality of institutions or relationships 
themselves. Examples of this normative approach to looking at markets include the role of 
women in trade, the credit systems (or usury to use a term with more derogatory 
connotations) and the role of commission agents.   
 
Actors may internalise rules and means of control that can be exerted by others over them 
and therefore not even contemplate the breaking of trust. This links to Lukes’ insights into 
forms of power, including power used to set the rules of the ‘moral economy’, allowing the 
values of certain groups to become internalised in society (Lukes, 1974). In such cases the 
concepts of trust and power are closely intertwined as norms and generalised trust are based 
on the power exerted over some people that denies them the ability to reflect.   
 
The evolution of conventions, institutions and norms cannot be assumed to support social 
order (Sayer, 2004). Granovetter (1994) also queries the functionalist approach common in 
much of New Institutional Economics that prioritises the role of benefits and incentives to 
individuals in the explanation of institutions. He and many others have shown that 
institutions are shaped by history, path dependency, social structures (such as gender, 
ethnicity and class) and their cultural context.  In this respect the ‘Old Institutional 
Economics’ attempts to move away from methodological individualism, where the 
individual is taken as given (Hodgson, 1998: 177), and look at institutions as formed and 
sustained by habit as well. 
 
Norms cannot be created at will. The production of norms is based on what Platteau (1994a: 
536) refers to as “historically-rooted cultural endowments”, upon which norms of a more 
generalised morality can be encouraged when the right conditions arise. Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (1993:1324-5) use the term ‘bounded solidarity’ which can lead to “the 
emergence of principled group-oriented behaviour ...If sufficiently strong, this emergent 
sentiment will lead to the observance of norms of mutual support, appropriable [sic] by 
individuals as a resource in their own pursuits.” Norms can also come from civil society if it 
is willing to take action against those who act outside the norms (Platteau, 1994b: 772).  
 
Norms can be strengthened through processes of socialization particularly through families 
and religious institutions. Ensminger (1992) describes how the development of markets for 
the pastoralist Orma people in Kenya was influenced by their conversion to Islam, and the 
use of Islamic institutions and rules of law.  Cohen (1971:278) observes how ‘indigenous 
traders become Moslems in order to partake in the moral community of other traders.  In 
both Ibadan and Freetown… all the butchers without exception have converted to Islam, 
because only in this way can they participate in the chain of trade in cattle….’.  
 
This paper will explore how the institutional forms allow access to certain means of 
production for those previously excluded but may also be a way of exerting power over 
them. In many cases the less powerful may be forced to accept some norms or institutions 
under the duress of poverty (Sayer, 2004) and Baier (1994) suggests that trust based 
relationships can result in conspiracy or exploitation, raising questions on the morality and 
immorality of trust.  
 
This leads to the final research questions of this paper: 
 What are the roles of moral norms in these relations and institutions? 
 
Methodology 
In order to explore the research questions of how trust is built up and the role of norms, this 
paper draws principally on qualitative research conducted on the Jos Plateau in 2001 and 
2004, but builds on earlier work conducted by the authors in this region and elsewhere.  
Eighty interviews were undertaken with vegetable farmers and diverse types of vegetable 
trader in rural, peri-urban and urban markets on the Jos Plateau. Interviewees were selected 
purposively to ensure a cross section of different activities, genders and wealth. Questions 
concentrated on critical incidents and examples of trust based relationships that they were or 
had been involved in, rather than relying on hypothetical cases or general opinions. 
Interviews were conducted in English where spoken by interviewees or in Hausa, Berom, 
Ibo or Yoruba, using interpreters. Most interviews took place in market places and allowed 
observations to be made of market activity such as disputes and selling strategies. These 
were referred to in interviews in order to gain more understanding.  The researchers were 
sensitive to their positionality as outsiders and to potential influence of interpreters from 
different ethnic groups. These biases were minimized by ensuring a range of methods were 
used (interviews, observations, informal discussions) combined with a sampling of 
interviewees that allowed comparison and cross checking of issues from multiple sources. 
 
Data analysis drew on grounded theory with careful analysis of comments and the reaction 
of respondents, particularly in those cases where they were asked questions that related to 
habitual behaviour. Data from a questionnaire survey of 127 wholesale traders is also drawn 
on.  
 
The case study: Vegetable trade on the Jos Plateau 
The Jos Plateau has specialized in vegetable production for the last 40 years. Despite 
national recession vegetable production has continued to grow on the Plateau, encouraged 
by the availability of water for irrigated dry season market gardening.  However conflict 
over access to land between indigenes and settlers erupted into a full-blown crisis in 
September 2001 when thousands of people lost their lives and vegetable production 
collapsed. The production and trade of vegetables recovered over the next few years with 
relationships rebuilt, an issue that will be discussed later. 
 
Vegetables are perishable and marketing systems have to move produce from farms to 
consumers in no more than two days as there is no cold storage The marketing chain is 
shown diagrammatically in figure 1. The commission agents are predominantly men, while 
women are involved in production, and retailing. Both local men and women may be 
involved in long distance trade to the South of the country, but a majority of such long 
distance traders appear to be male.  
 
Figure 1 Urban marketing chain 
 
Traders’ finance for farmers 
None of the vegetable traders we interviewed in the course of our research had received any 
bank loans. The problem with small business lending is the official invisibility of collateral 
(i.e. legal absence) and perception that trading is too risky, even in NGO led micro-finance 
programmes. Our survey found that wholesale traders ‘help’ an average of 4 farmers with a 
total of N11,000 (roughly £50 or the equivalent of two month’s income for poorer farmers) 
worth of goods with agreements based on trust. In discussions with Moslems reference is 
commonly made not to loans but to ‘help’, since usury is forbidden in Islam. 
 
Table 1. Credit systems among whole traders in the past year  
 
 
Traders benefit from ‘helping’ farmers (often members of a different ethnic group) as they 
will gain more business through the close relationships so developed. Farmers are not 
allowed to sell to other traders until they have repaid the loan. In the case of crop failure, 
farmers and traders stated that repayment could be delayed for a season: “If a farmer has a 
shortfall then they can come and explain. We have an understanding to repay later.”  
Once farmers have paid what is owed to traders, the close relationship will enable the 
wholesale buyers to sell more of the farmers’ harvest to other traders on credit and pay the 
farmers later. 
 
The traders who give credit are predominantly commission agents or dillalai, although other 
types of traders were found helping farmers. Traders have to have adequate capital 
themselves or access to fertiliser themselves on credit. One dillali was found to act as a 
guarantor for nine farmers, each wanting five bags of fertiliser (a total sum of N76,500).  
 
Transactions between traders in the market are also often carried out on credit. The extent of 
this is indicated in table 1. As with the credit to farmers, the traders give on credit to those 
they know and to those they can put pressure on : “some they chop the money and so I can 
only harass them and they might give slowly” (trader, Farin Gada Market).  
 
In these credit markets, while it might seem, superficially, that the credit supplier has the 
upper hand, it is clear that most credit relationships are built up gradually and with care on 
both sides, for while the trader can exert pressure, an over-pressured poor farmer or petty 
trader can call on local moral judgments to support his/her decision to renege on 
responsibilities to repay.   
 
Bargaining, pricing and information gathering 
In all wholesale markets on the Jos Plateau, prices are agreed following bargaining between 
individual buyers and sellers. Dillalai commission agents play a key role in bargaining on 
behalf of farmers (and many are also farmers on their own account).  Trust is important in 
this relationship as one leading trader stated:  “the dillali is the number one trusted man in 
the market. The farmer does not get the money until after the sale and does not always know 
the price” (market association leader, Farin gada market). 
 
Those farmers with less access to information and credit are content to allow them to take 
their commission for this: ‘I don’t lose and he doesn’t lose because I needed money for 
farming’ (discussion with farmer and his dillali, Barikin Ladi farm produce market, 
Heipang).   However, larger, well-informed farmers with access to other forms of finance 
often resent having to pay commission.  
 
To become a dillali an individual has to go through an apprenticeship process. They learn 
about the market institutions and the expected norms of behaviour. There are unwritten rules 
and norms stating how traders behave and stopping traders actively poaching customers 
from others: “there are no rules but if someone is greedy then you try not to work with him. 
If a farmer has been with you, he does not have the right to go to another dillali unless 
something happens between you two. If a dillali calls a farmer secretly then we report the 
dillali to the (association) office” (interview Maraba Foron market).  Only when they have 
been observed by the other dillalai for some time is this apprenticeship period over; they can 
then register in the market where they operate.  During this period they also have to amass 
the capital necessary to start business.   
 
Customer relations are also found between source market traders and those coming from 
other cities, demonstrating the importance of long distance relationships.. “When they come, 
I give them food and drink and somewhere to lay their head before going to the market, or to 
spend the night… there is never a problem, they all depart in peace because of the 
friendship. They get chicken and rice and even a ram at Christmas … I know them through 
trading and I’ve done trading with their parents and their children” (Trader in Farin Gada).  
One Berom farmer, describing his 20-year relationship with his Ibo dillali in Enugu 
observed: I stay always with Ambrose in Onitsha… because we are friends.  We are both 
Christians so we don’t fear one another…. I trust him and he trusts me. I don’t pay my food 
there; when I’m leaving there he sometimes gives me half or three-quarters of the transport 
cost…. He stays in my house here…. Last year he came here twice and I went there three 
times.   (Farmer, Heipang market, 2004) This trust-based relationship is old, but its 
presentation in religious terms represents the shift towards more ethnic and religious based 
differentiation in business. This was exacerbated by the 2001 conflict in Jos. 
 The crucial factor affecting bargaining power is information. Both buyers and sellers have to 
gain as much information about the supply and demand, and how this affects prices in 
producing areas or urban consumption markets. This is only available from having 
personalized trust-based links. Because of farmers’ location in remoter areas their sources of 
information are limited   
 
Wholesale traders and dillalai have wider trust-based networks that can be drawn on to 
gather price information. Dillalai justify their positions on the basis of their ability to gather 
price information and bargain more effectively than farmers. Itinerant traders are often very 
mobile and visit markets themselves to get price information. They also have information 
from the markets they come from. Mobile phones have become increasingly important over 
the last few years, although they may only benefit the richer traders and they still require a 
trusted person at the other end of the phone to provide information. 
 
Traders resident in Plateau markets rely on obtaining information from those traders who 
have been to other markets recently. One trader referred to “colleagues” who could be relied 
upon to “tell us when they come back” but another stated that “those coming do not tell the 
truth”.    
 
Market associations in the study area 
 
In each urban market there are associations and committees which manage the market as a 
whole or operate as smaller associations. The roles of established associations include 
welfare for the trader members for unforeseen circumstances and help at ceremonies such as 
marriages and funerals. When traders lose large amounts of money through collapsed prices, 
robbery or a broken vehicle, the association can act as insurance by helping them to start up 
again.  
 
A second key role is the settling of minor disputes through sanctioning norm breakers  
instead of bringing in the police. Those who are caught cheating or stealing are banned from 
the market by the association chair. They also regulate the dillalai commission agents. “They 
register all the dillalai so they cannot run off with the farmers’ money… they need to know 
the type of person you are and that you will not run off” (market association leader, Farin 
gada market). 
 
Linked to dispute settlement is the protection of the market’s image and ensure norms of 
marketing are upheld. Maraba Foron promotes itself as being a peaceful market and this is 
one of the main attractions for traders coming to buy. The association therefore hires private 
security to minimize theft and break up conflicts within the market. The markets also want 
to ensure that the quality of the produce is good, farmers are paid and defaulters punished so 
that the reputation of the market spreads. The markets are dependent on credit sales and they 
do not want to deter farmers from bringing quality supplies. 
 
Thirdly, associations can organise sales by enforcing market-specific rules and norms. This 
may be by giving incoming traders places to unload, making sure farmers sell to dillalai and 
keeping records of the quantities brought in by each person. They can also play a role in 
controlling supplies. At times of surplus the leaders of the Building Material market 
association can stop people coming to sell and tell others to pack up and go. This is a 
contentious issue and although it only occurs at specific times, places and commodities, it is 
frequently citied in policy discourse referring to unethical practices within trader 
associations.  
 
Fourthly, associations may be responsible for maintaining the infrastructure of the market 
providing security guards, allocating land or licenses for sheds to be built and lobbying local 
government. Finally, associations in some markets are responsible for collecting revenue on 
each unit of produce sold for the local government or owner of the market place.  
 
Discussion 
The wide range of institutional forms 
No evidence of recourse to legal contracts or structures was found.  Interviewees reported 
that they were reliant on personal trust and institutions operating in parallel to the state.   
 
In the absence of formal finance from banks, the system is dependent on other sources that 
have the benefit of flexiblility for both sides. In 2001 over half of urban tomato wholesale 
traders interviewed were providing long term credit to supplier farmers, and a similar 
proportion were giving credit to their buying customers. While direct questions on rates of 
interest were not possible, the actual rates of interest being charged were reported to be 
much higher than banks but come in the form of lower prices offered for produce as found in 
other examples of interlinked markets (Bhattacharyya, 2005). Those receiving this credit 
perceived that it was a vital part of measures to ensure commercial activities and to improve 
their livelihoods and wellbeing. Clough (1985) and Watts (1987) reported forms of 
indebtedness to traders amongst staple crop farmers in parts of Northern Nigeria. However, 
none of the farmers interviewed reported any knowledge of this happening. Those receiving 
trader finance stated that the support of traders was very important in helping them grow 
their dry season farming operations. 
 
Similar trust-based relationships are found throughout the Nigerian food system and there is 
also evidence that these permeate through the state system as well.  Harnischfeger (2003:28) 
notes the importance of  patronage of prominent officials or politicians in legal cases.  Other 
studies have shown the importance of traders building trust-based relationships with 
officials, particularly for cross border activities (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2000; Roitman, 2004). 
 
This demonstrates the importance of trust in Nigerian situations and challenges approaches 
to understanding different cultures as being either ‘high’ or ‘low’ trust. The findings here 
demonstrate the importance of making a distinction between personalized and institutionally 
based trust, each of which may be vary between high and low in different contexts.  
 
Personal versus institutional forms of trust 
The empirical findings show  that individuals draw on both personalised social relations and 
institutional forms of trust (Bennet and Robson, 2004; Mollering, 2002; Zucker, 1986).  
Personalized trust is shown to be based on having information on the other party and the 
ability to sanction those that do not behave as expected.  
 
Traders take considerable risks in lending to people who could disappear and the issue of 
personalised trust was often brought up as a way to reduce this risk. To build up trust traders 
have to gather information about the farmers prior behaviour and also have sanctions or 
potential ways of putting pressure on them if they try to avoid repaying. In this way they 
balance both controls and goodwill or benevolence (Nooteboom, 2004). The types of 
relationships that are drawn on are existing relationships through kinship, community or 
church links, working relationships built up over time, friendships that come out of the 
working relationship, and intermediaries who are known to both sides.  
 
Information is gathered on the competence of the person to repay by visiting the farm, 
assessing its size and asking others about their ability as farmers. By working together the 
farmers and traders learn more about each other. One trader stated: “ I know him - in and out 
of season we are all together”. Information about the person’s character and behaviour is 
also gathered from people in the recipient’s community and traders may go to visit the 
village and the farmer’s house. This allows traders to meet the family members and other 
villagers. If there is a problem with repayment, traders can use the family members, leading 
farmers in the village or the village head to settle disputes and put social pressure on the 
farmer. Meeting family members also acts as a proof of giving the loan. Farmers may also 
be asked to ‘sign evidence before collecting’. 
 
The sources of information may also come from using intermediaries, particularly the elders 
of the different types of associations. These intermediaries are able to build on bilateral 
relationships and allow multilateral relationships to evolve through being a guarantor.  There 
are also specific sanctions available such as exclusion from marketing activity, ending of 
relationships as well as other moral pressures which will be discussed in detail in the next 
section.   
 
Institutional-based trust is built on parallel organizations to the state that can take on a range 
of regulatory roles and allow confidence in others’ actions without personal relations. These 
include trader associations, traditional chieftaincy systems and community leadership and 
allow individuals to take action against others if an agreement is not honoured. These 
institutions tend to become parallel institutions to the state as public sector supported 
institutions are not perceived to be trustworthy due to the high degree of corruption. The 
studies found no formal legal basis for any of the transactions but contracts are partly 
enforced by market associations and traditional authorities. These organisations also regulate 
the market place through settling disputes, regulating the activities of the dillalai, organising 
private ‘vigilante’ security groups, providing forms of insurance and controlling the use of 
the market space.  However, there are questions over how accountable these organizational 
forms are (beyond their members’ needs) and their ability to enforce public good regulations 
such as unfair competition, consumer protection and environmental controls.  While power 
that can be drawn from mutual action in the market associations, i.e. there is a collaborative 
side to power in the form of social solidarity which enables trust in the collective (Arendt 
1958), it will not necessarily operate positively for all traders.  Some groups may not be 
physically excluded from the market space but rather smothered by a dominant coding of 
that space in which they are invisible, by virtue of low status (Lefebvre 1991). This may 
mean they are unable to access the information available to others. However, over time such 
groups may also combine together to assert their right to space.  In Plateau markets the 
expanding role of local Birom and other Plateau people in the vegetable trade has been 
achieved despite the evident dominance of Hausa traders in Jos urban vegetable markets.   
 
Role of moral norms in shaping trust and power relations: the moral economy  
Norms define what actions are considered acceptable or unacceptable and are therefore the 
basis of building and maintaining personalised trust and institutions in themselves. Moral 
norms of reciprocity are the most commonly referred to in this study, particularly with 
regard to customer relationships. These relationships, frequently between people from 
different ethnic groups, were found to be able to withstand the serious conflict between 
ethnic groups which occurred in Jos in 2001, even though the origin of the conflict was 
linked to resentment against traders of a particular ethnic group. 
 
These norms of reciprocity were often referred to in terms of friendship and obligation to 
others. Each party may try to build up these links in order to have better safeguards based on 
a common understanding of moral behaviour and obligation to friends. Co-operation in long 
distance trading relationships is frequently cemented through landlord relationships whereby 
the trader of one ethnic group will reside with another ethnic group while his/her goods are 
being sold (Cohen, 1971; Hill, 1971; Mortimore, 1989:131). This provides a sense of 
security, even if the landlord takes some advantage of his client’s limited knowledge of local 
conditions and languages: “The [Ibo] dillali that takes you to his house personally has shown 
great concern. There are many thieves in the east. If you go to lodge and get attacked you 
won’t return to him. So you are safe…. You go back to him because of the relationship 
between you, even though he has cheated you. If you go to another place it could be even 
worse. … he respects me because I help him earn a living (driver/farmer from Tudun Mazat, 
Barikin Ladi district, talking about the 6-year business relationship with his Ibo dillali based 
in Onitsha, January 2004). In such cases there is considerable inequality in the relationship 
but there is still an element of choice despite the dominant position of one party. While this 
is not optimal, interviewees amongst less powerful parties stated that without these 
relationships they would be excluded from activity in distant markets.  
 
Other important norms include interactions with strangers, keeping agreements, avoiding 
deception, not stealing customers or outbidding fellow traders. The moral norms regarding 
the relationship between competitor traders are strongly enforced as this allows the markets 
to operate without descending into chaos and results in traders regarding those carrying out 
the same activities as colleagues rather than competitors.  
 
Norms can be applied consciously and rely on altruism and benevolence as well as social 
consensus to enforce sanctions on those that break them. The sanctions or motivations may 
come in the form of shame, peer pressure, damaging reputations, physical threats or drawing 
on obligations (Scott, 1976). Individuals are pressured into keeping to norms by those 
around them. This can be done by withdrawal of co-operation, disapproval and attaching 
social stigma to norm breakers. Pressure can also be exerted through forms of authority and 
the roles of different forms of association and community leaders are demonstrated in the 
case study. The strength of their authority is based on their own set of norms that include 
common beliefs, values, traditions and practice that result in the recognition of the 
authority’s right to command. Norms of leadership are adapted from common forms of 
behaviour of those involved. Examples include the form of the trader associations drawing 
norms of leadership found in the chieftaincy system.  
 
There are also norms that are imposed or applied in a non-reflective habitual manner, rather 
than a conscious calculation. Nooteboom (2002) refers to these as routinzed behaviour. This 
may be carried out as a form of altruism or where rules are internalized and people do not 
even contemplate the idea of breaking these unspoken rules. In this study evidence of such 
occurrences occurred when interviewees would laugh at questions being asked. These norms 
of behaviour are closely linked to issues of unquestioning obedience which is a way power 
can be exerted (Clegg, 1989). (This opens up potential ethnical considerations with regard to 
the researcher influencing the situation being researched and changing the power dynamics 
being studied).  
 While norms may be enforced through sanctions, there are also norms that determine which 
sanctions or forms of coercion are acceptable. The ability to make threats and carry them out 
is shaped by the norms of what is deemed acceptable behaviour. In Ghana’s Central Region, 
individuals claimed they were restricted from taking forceful action against people from 
their own community as they did not want a confrontation and to ‘get a bad name’ (Lyon, 
2000). On the Plateau we heard similar sentiments expressed: “there   have been a few cases 
[of stealing]. We send them away. We don’t take them to the police station because we have 
been together.  Maybe if you can recognise your mistakes and promise not to do it again… if 
you repent you can stay (Hussain, loader at Building Materials market).   
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
Obligation to cooperate or reciprocate is also based on common norms to support family or 
fellow workers or community members.  These norms may be very different to the accepted 
norms of how others are treated, as we saw in the case of the loaders above. This 
demonstrates the importance of considering the plurality or norms dependent on the existing 
and emerging relationship of the two parties. Traders were found to draw on these 
obligations to follow norms by visiting a customer’s house and getting know other family 
members and community members who might be able to put pressure on the customer 
should there be any problems in the relationship.  
 
The norms of behaviour towards family, community members or those working closely 
together can also include limitations on the sanctions available. Such cases demonstrate the 
difference in norms for distant others (Sayer, 2004). There is also a connection between the 
existence of relative moral norms and the moral norms for relatives, where the prioritisation 
of kin is accepted behaviour and there is disdain for those who violate this moral norm. 
Platteau, (1994b: 799) states that where there is an emphasis on the strength of ties to close 
social relations reward and sanction are linked to patronage and dominated by the political 
power structures. With regard to corruption, Olivier de Sardan (1999) states that social 
disapproval makes denouncing kin and friends unthinkable.  
 
The evolving nature of moral norms is shown as new opportunities arise and people enter 
new economic activities. For example the rapid growth in the vegetable trade in the study 
area over the past 20 years has led to changes in the relationships between ethnic groups.   
At first there were rather gradual changes as indigenes learned how to grow irrigated 
vegetables by taking farms next to their Hausa tenants and watching their activities closely; 
then some indigenes started to trade directly with southern Nigeria, bypassing the Hausa 
dealers in Jos (Porter et al., 2003),  Recently more dramatic changes have occurred with the 
violent conflict of 2001, but also as the different actors have rebuilt relationships following 
that. It is interesting to note that many non-indigene vegetable traders and indigene farmers 
were able to rebuild their inter-ethnic business relationships very rapidly after this conflict, 
while others not involved in the food trade were still highly antagonistic.  
 
Norms have also shifted over the last 20 years with the declining role of the state and 
increased levels of corruption and violence. This has resulted in a rise in new institutional 
forms such as vigilantism and private security (often introduced in markets through the 
agency of the market associations). This was found to have serious repercussions in the case 
study region when a simmering conflict became a bloodbath with thousands killed when 
security services could not curtail revenge attacks following a specific spark.  While these 
forms of parallel institutions to the state can meet immediate needs, there is also concern that 
they do not have systems of accountability to the wider community (see Alemika 
2003:23,32-33) and may only represent particular ethnic groups in multi-ethnic areas. 
Furthermore, particular groups may clearly have a vested interest in sustaining these systems 
to protect their illegal businesses.   
 
In the study area, the role of religion (Islam and Christianity) has been increasing in 
importance. Traders suggest religion shapes their own moral approaches, but it does not 
appear to be substantially reshaping how and with whom the vegetable business is transacted 
post the 2001 crisis.   The issue of Islamic sharia law, while very important in other parts of 
Nigeria, was not mentioned by anyone we interviewed, although this may be due to the 
sensitivity of the subject following the conflict and ongoing tensions. 
 
There are also debates about the role of markets and forms of capitalism in shaping norms 
and the moral economy (Booth, 1994; Hirschman, 1982). In this case there is clear evidence 
of the role of the market in rebuilding or preserving trust based relations after the 2001 
conflict. For example the private market owners at Mararaba Foron tomato market on the 
Jos Plateau made a clear stand against attacks on Hausa/Moslem traders during the 2001 
crisis. Some indigen traders who were not prepared to abide by the market owner’s rules 
moved to a market nearby, but most soon returned.  
 
Perceived morality of different forms of economic institutions 
The moral economy also relates to what is considered fair and to acceptable forms of 
livelihood. The study found that different actors have different discourses concerning the 
key institutions of trade. The most contentious of these are the role of trader finance, the 
roles of commission agents, and the roles of trader associations and means of controlling 
access to markets.  
 
While most interviewees (farmers and traders) considered offering loans as unacceptable 
usury, many also considered trader credit to farmers as ‘providing help’ rather than loans, 
pre-harvest sales or crop futures, all of which carry negative connotations of indebtedness on 
the part of the farmer and usury on the part of the traders. In particular, the discourse of 
trader finance as ‘help’ was found amongst traders and poorer farmers. The discourse of 
richer traders is more antagonistic to traders as they do not require the finance. The study 
shows that not all trust based relationships may be perceived as moral (Baier, 1994) and the 
degree of acceptance depends on the extent to which the less powerful parties have any other 
choice of livelihood. In such cases trust is based on an elmenet of domination but weaker 
parties were still found to have an element of choice of whether to enter into the relationship 
or not.  
 
There are also debates amongst farmers and traders in the study area concerning the morality 
of controlling access to markets and limiting the ability to sell without going through the 
dillalai. This restricts opportunities for some, and if there is any control on supply of 
produce, can have the effect of lowering rural prices and raising urban ones. However, it is 
also argued that some control inhibits dramatic price fluctuations and is a way of ensuring 
that small scale traders continue to be willing to invest their limited capital in a high risk 
environment. Only in one market was there any evidence of prices being set and supply 
controlled. This is in contrast to reports of several markets in southern Nigeria having fixed 
prices through controlling the number of trucks bringing in produce, and stopping people 
buying from unregistered sellers. In the producing regions, this control was not considered 
possible because of the close relationship with farmers and pressure not to let produce rot in 
the fields: ”here anyone can offload and sometimes there is so much…the price comes down 
and you can loose…Here we cannot control the number of trucks coming in because they 
produce it here and it may spoil on the farm .. here is a farmers’ market” (Trader, Farin 
Gada Market). 
This statement suggests that proximity (both spatial and social) between parties shapes the 
moral norms being used, with ‘distant others’ being treated differently from those who are 
closer.  
 
The discourse of community leaders and politicians is frequently antagonistic to traders with 
references to usury and ‘exploitative middlemen’ (despite the fact that many traders are 
women). This is particularly noticeable where ethnic groups dominate parts of the marketing 
chain. The perceptions and discourses of immorality and unfairness of certain ethnic groups 
dominating particular parts of the marketing chain, were used by some community leaders 
and local politicians to stoke the ethnic conflict in 2001. They were able to draw on and 
manipulate perceived norms of what are considered to be unacceptable actions. It is 
interesting to note that following the conflict, relationships of indigenous farmers and Hausa 
traders are less antagonistic than between indigenes and Hausas not involved in food trading 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated the importance of informal social institutions that are 
underpinned by a range of moral norms.   It also examines the range of discourses on these 
institutions, such as the role of traders, credit systems and market associations. The use of an 
empirical study has demonstrated that theoretical discussions of trust need to be 
complemented by analysis of how economic practice and behaviour is embedded in 
culturally specific contexts. The effectiveness of these practices varies widely: this study 
notes the variation from market to market, from day to day and from commodity to 
commodity.  
 
In the past century there have been ongoing attempts to negate the importance of informal 
social institutions and norms, as it has been assumed that arms-length transactions and 
formal legal measures would remove the need for personalized relationships, and bring a 
more efficient and (ostensibly) more equitable system into being. Within development 
economics there were assumptions of ‘modernisation’ away from ‘traditional’ forms of 
economic organisation in the 1950s-1970s (Moore, 1997: 313), followed by doctrinal 
paradigms of  ‘liberalisation’ and Structural Adjustment Policies with the opening of 
economies to more ‘rational’ larger firms (Chang, 2005). However, as found elsewhere,  
social regulations are resistant and adapt (Harriss-White, 2005: 23). While there is now more 
interest in social institutions, in the international donor community they are often considered 
as unfavourable factors that can explain the failure of the liberalization policies (Chang, 
2005: 18) 
 
Moral norms are constantly shifting not only as economies change but also within the 
shifting political and socio-cultural context. There is a plurality of norms that shifts 
according to interplay between the dominant participating parties. This case study was 
carried out before and after a period of conflict and demonstrates not only how norms can 
shift over short periods of time but also how efforts may be made to reinstate them in very 
similar form, as actors attempt to restore order and ‘normality’. It shows not only how norms 
of what is considered fair can be used to stoke conflict but also how norms of reciprocity 
and obligation to customers can help to rebuild economic life – and, through that, social life 
- after conflict. 
 
Normative approaches and ethics with regard to well-being raise questions regarding whose 
well-being is to be maximized and what is the meaning being morally justified. In our Jos 
vegetable marketing case study there are questions about the morality of credit systems, 
commission agents, market associations and ways of avoiding or minimizing police 
corruption and also about how such institutions are utilised by different genders and ethnic 
groups. Our evidence suggests that spatially extended trust-based systems for local ethnic 
groups have grown considerably in recent years, with increasing dependence on religious as 
opposed to ethnic ties. However, these restructured networks more commonly benefit men 
than women, because women’s activities tend to be firmly ensconced at the lower end of the 
trade hierarchy in local market places.   Nonetheless, the evidence as a whole suggests that 
while moral regulation is imperfect and inevitably compromised by inequalities of power, it 
exhibits clear practical adequacy in that it enables economic functioning across the region.  
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 Figure 1 Urban marketing chain 
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Figure 2: Norms underpinning trust relations 
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Table 1. Credit systems among whole traders in the past year  
 
 
 
 
 
Markets 
Average 
number of 
recipients of 
credit from 
traders 
Average 
amount given 
at one time 
Percentage 
of wholesale 
traders 
buying 
vegetables 
on credit 
Percentage 
of wholesale  
traders 
selling 
vegetables 
on credit 
Farin Gada 
N=39 
4.2 N 9,808 41.0% 51.3% 
Buildings 
Materials 
(N=49) 
2.6 N 12,476 69.4% 59.2% 
Maraba 
Foron 
(N=39) 
5.5 N 10,633 56.4% 38.5% 
Total 
(N=127) 
4.0 N 11,119 56.7% 50.4% 
Note: Jos urban market vegetable trader survey, January 2001 
 
 
